Narrative Styles and Institutional Isomorphism in South African CEOs’ Shareholder Letters by du Toit, Elda & Esterhuyse, Leana
AJIC Issue 27, 2021        1
Narrative Styles and Institutional Isomorphism in South African CEOs’ 
Shareholder Letters 
Elda du Toit
Associate Professor, Department of Financial Management, University of Pretoria
 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8386-7969
Leana Esterhuyse
Senior Lecturer, Department of Financial Intelligence, University of South Africa, Pretoria
 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0140-7980
Abstract
Among the most-read corporate documents are chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) 
shareholder letters. Using institutional isomorphism as lens, this study examines the 
extent to which the narrative styles used by South African CEOs in their sharehold-
er letters are similar to the styles used by CEOs at leading international companies. 
The study also explores the degree to which impression management techniques are 
present in the South African CEOs’ shareholder letters. The study uses DICTION 
software to conduct a narrative analysis of South African CEOs’ shareholder letters 
for a single financial year, and compares the findings with those drawn from the 
Craig and Amernic (2018) study of the shareholder letters of CEOs from samples of 
international Fortune 500 and FTSE 100 companies. The study finds that optimism 
and realism are the two most-used narrative styles in South African CEOs’ share-
holder letters, and that these findings are markedly similar to those generated by the 
Craig and Amernic (2018) study of international companies. The study contributes 
to the understanding of normative institutional isomorphism in corporate reporting 
by providing empirical evidence that the narrative styles employed by CEOs of com-
panies in a developing economy with high corporate governance standards conform 
to the same norms as those of CEOs of large international companies. The study also 
finds that the South African CEOs’ dominant communication styles in the share-
holder letters lend themselves to being tools of impression management.
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1. Introduction
Until recently, the focus of most accounting research was on quantitative information 
disclosed by companies. However, there is now growing recognition of the impor-
tance of qualitative information that captures risks, opportunities, and organisational 
relationships that quantitative information alone cannot provide (Allee & DeAnge-
lis, 2015; Arena et al., 2015; Bonsall & Miller, 2017; González et al., 2021; Laskin, 
2018; Mmako, 2016; Mmako & Jansen van Rensburg, 2017). As a result of the sepa-
ration of management and ownership in organisations, and the resulting information 
asymmetry, quality financial and non-financial communication is key to ensuring 
cohesion and shared understanding between management and stakeholders. 
Companies are encouraged to communicate their actions and activities to stakehold-
ers in a transparent way (SEC, 1998; IoDSA, 2009, 2016; JSE, 2013). According to 
the mimetic and normative institutional isomorphism theory, companies may at first 
mimic each other in their disclosure style, and then, over time, the disclosure practic-
es become normalised or standardised with little thought given to them (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983). At the same time, communication styles can be used to influence 
reactions (Yuthas, Rogers & Dillard, 2002), manage expectations (Asay et al., 2018a; 
Laskin, 2018), and/or shape perceptions, according to impression management the-
ory (Allee & DeAngelis, 2015). The scope for impression management is limited in 
quantitative corporate reporting (e.g., audited financial statements), but this scope 
widens considerably in qualitative reporting, where language can be used to shape 
investors’ perceptions (Leung, Parker & Courtis, 2015; Smith & Taffler, 2000; Syd-
serff & Weetman, 2002).
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Most studies of communication styles in corporate reports focus on companies locat-
ed in the US, the UK, and other developed economies. This study looks at practices 
in South Africa, an emerging economy. Applying an institutional isomorphism lens, 
the study investigates the extent to which the narrative styles deployed by South 
African chief executive officers (CEOs) in their shareholder letters follow the com-
munication styles of their counterparts, as studied by Craig and Amernic (2018), in 
Fortune 500 and FTSE 100 international companies. We also examine the extent 
to which South African CEOs’ shareholder letters exhibit the use of impression 
management techniques. Among other things, this study seeks to answer the call by 
Allee and DeAngelis (2015) and Laskin (2018) for more research into the narrative 
styles used by companies in communicating their financial and non-financial results.
South Africa provides a valuable environment for investigation of communication 
styles in corporate reports, as it is one of the countries at the forefront of the world-
wide development of corporate governance codes, with its King Commission de-
veloping and regularly updating codes that are integrated into Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange ( JSE) Listings Requirements. According to the World Economic Forum’s 
(WEF) 2019 Global Competitiveness Report, South Africa ranked 26th out of 141 
countries for corporate governance, while the US ranked 31st and the UK 13th. 
The JSE Listings Requirements ( JSE, 2019) specify that companies must follow the 
guidelines in the King IV Code on Corporate Governance (IoDSA, 2016), specifi-
cally concerning preparing concise integrated reports that use plain language. In re-
spect of matters of potential institutional isomorphism, South Africa’s common law 
legal system and history under British colonial rule allow for useful exploration of 
the extent to which its corporate practices exhibit similarities to those of companies 
with strong Anglo-American ties. 
2. Literature review
Institutional isomorphism
Corporate reporting has its earliest roots in agency theory ( Jensen & Meckling, 
1976), as the historical purpose of the financial report was to provide information 
about fiduciary responsibilities. Managers voluntarily disclose information in order 
to reduce information asymmetry between themselves and owners (shareholders) 
and to signal their competence and trustworthiness ( Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Spence, 1973). Research has established that investor decision-making is significant-
ly affected by what managers choose to say, as well as how they say it (González et al., 
2019). This is seen in verbal (Allee & DeAngelis, 2015) and written communications 
(Breton, 2009). In addition to reducing information asymmetry, corporate reporting 
can also serve legitimising purposes. Companies engage in and report on certain 
activities, e.g., building schools in the community, in order to obtain approval from 
society and to retain access to resources (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Deephouse, 
1996; Suchman, 1995). Observing this type of reporting by fellow companies can 
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also lead to institutional isomorphism, because organisations in similar situations 
tend to make use of similar structures (De Villiers, Low & Samkin, 2014; Heugens 
& Lander, 2009). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identify three types of institutional isomorphism, 
namely, coercive, mimetic, and normative. In the corporate reporting context, coercive 
isomorphism occurs when outside pressures, such as those from regulators or stake-
holders, force companies to disclose information in a specific way or with a particular 
emphasis (Areneke, Yusuf & Kimani, 2019). Mimetic isomorphism typically occurs 
when there is uncertainty around new reporting practices, which encourages com-
panies to mimic early adopters (De Villiers et al., 2014). Mimetic isomorphism can 
also be observed when companies follow or mimic others’ resistance to new reporting 
practices (Maroun & Van Zijl, 2016; Nel & Esterhuyse, 2019). Normative isomor-
phism results from companies starting to perceive a certain “way of doing” as the 
norm and implementing the specific disclosure style because of what they believe is 
normal or “how it has always been done”, or when practices are performed by persons 
from the same profession or training (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Mizruchi & Fein, 
1999; Suddaby & Viale, 2011). 
An example of institutional isomorphism in the South African reporting context can 
be found in De Villiers and Alexander (2014), who report finding no meaningful 
differences between South African and Australian mining companies in the vast ma-
jority (29 out of 30) of the disclosure patterns in their corporate social responsibility 
reports—which is evidence of the normative isomorphism that De Villiers and Alex-
ander attribute to the professionalisation of reporting based on common “templates”. 
Furthermore, smaller South African mining companies were found to be disclosing 
the same amount of environmental information in their reports as were the larger 
South African mining companies (De Villiers & Alexander, 2014). 
Impression management
Impression management refers to narrative disclosures that are presented in a way 
that promotes the image that the company wants to portray (Breton, 2009; Geppert 
& Lawrence, 2008; Mmako, 2016). Impression management is connected to legit-
imacy theory, as legitimacy is achievable only if public impressions of a company’s 
activities are positive (sometimes regardless of actual company performance). Com-
panies can therefore mimic each other to ensure that they obtain legitimacy through 
disclosures, using impression management. As the need to obtain legitimacy through 
managing impressions becomes the norm, normative institutional isomorphism en-
sues. Corporate narrative reporting can therefore be used by companies to manage 
perceptions and thus maintain legitimacy (Ben‐Amar & Belgacem, 2018; Bozzolan, 
Cho & Michelon, 2015; Martins et al., 2019; Melloni, Caglio & Perego, 2017). 
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Impression management theory holds that managers use reports to convey selective 
information and in a manner that benefits the organisation and themselves, even if 
not necessarily to the benefit of stakeholders (Allee & DeAngelis, 2015; Arena et al., 
2015; Asay et al., 2018b; Bozzolan et al., 2015; Cho, Roberts & Patten, 2010; Mar-
tins et al., 2019; Leung et al., 2015; Sydserff & Weetman, 2002; Yuthas et al., 2002). 
As Cho et al. (2010, p. 432) state, “[…] the more firm performance differs from a 
desired benchmark, the more management is motivated to manage impressions, and 
the more likely it is that narrative disclosure will be affected by a self-serving bias.”
This self-serving bias (Leung et al., 2015), expressed through impression manage-
ment tactics in earnings press releases, is rewarded by, for example, equity shares 
(Arslan-Ayaydin, Boudt & Thewissen, 2016), which managers can receive if the 
company that they manage is thought to perform well. Managers also attempt to in-
fluence analysts when management issues earnings guidance (for next period’s earn-
ings target), and subsequently in press releases and conference calls with analysts, 
when actual results are announced and discussed in relation to prior guidance and 
targets (Washburn & Bromiley, 2014). 
Yakis-Douglas et al. (2014) find that managers communicate more to manage mar-
ket perceptions of merger and acquisition deal announcements, the successful out-
come of which will reflect well on the manager. Older CEOs and those with a longer 
tenure at a company have been found to provide less forward-looking information 
and to be less optimistic in their quarterly earnings conference calls, indicating that 
security of tenure plays a role in the communication style of CEOs (Bochkay, Chy-
chyla & Nanda, 2019). Another impression management tactic is obfuscation, where 
messages are manipulated or made overly complicated, and certain pieces of infor-
mation are concealed or omitted through minimal narrative disclosure (Arena et al., 
2015; Asay et al., 2018b; Ben‐Amar & Belgacem, 2018; Bonsall & Miller, 2017; Cho 
et al., 2010; Goel et al., 2010; Leung et al., 2015; Melloni et al., 2017). This contrasts 
with calls by users for clear and concise disclosure stretching back as far as the 1960s 
(Lawrence, 2013). To this end, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
in 1998 published A Plain English Handbook: How to Create Clear SEC Disclosure 
Documents, asking companies to use clearly understandable language in their narra-
tive disclosures (SEC, 1998). In South Africa, the Institute of Directors in Southern 
Africa has requested the same (IoDSA, 2009) from South African corporate report 
preparers as part of IoDSA’s integrated reporting and governance reforms embedded 
in the various King Codes on Corporate Governance.
CEO shareholder letters as vehicles for impression management
The individual CEO can frame the narrative that they want to convey to the reader-
ship (Dikolli et al., 2020; Mmako, 2016). The chosen narrative could have effects on 
the readers/shareholders, e.g., consistently using words in the letter that emphasise 
shareholder value, year after year, has been found to markedly reduce the chances 
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of the CEO being dismissed (Shin & You, 2020). Asay et al. (2018a) find that use 
of personal pronouns and the presence of a picture of the CEO with the share-
holder letter both affect investors’ perceptions. Craig and Amernic (2018) call the 
shareholder letter “staged discourse”, as it is written in the CEO’s name, in contrast 
to much of the rest of the integrated annual report. Much thought goes into the 
shareholder letter, as it should reflect on the results obtained in the year under review 
and prospects for the future (Aerts & Yan, 2017; González et al., 2019). The letter 
is, therefore, an excellent source for determining the use of selective narrative styles. 
The findings of Asay et al. (2018a), Craig and Amernic (2018), Craig and Brennan 
(2012), Greiner et al. (2020), and Shin and You (2020) on narrative styles in CEOs’ 
shareholder letters are consistent with impression management theory, i.e., they find 
that narrative styles are used strategically and that researchers can make certain ob-
servations from the language choices employed in these texts. 
Most studies on CEO shareholder letters have been performed on companies listed 
in the US, the UK, and other developed economies. Very little research has been 
conducted using textual analysis of corporate reports in South Africa. Mmako (2016) 
and Mmako and Janse van Rensburg (2017) investigate, in CEO shareholder letters 
of the largest South African companies, the priority (order of presentation) given 
to certain disclosure items required by integrated reporting, but they do not analyse 
narrative styles per se. Du Toit (2017) examines readability issues (but not narrative 
style) in integrated annual reports in South Africa (i.e., not limited to shareholder 
letters, per se) and establishes that integrated reports that more closely comply with 
integrated reporting disclosure guidelines are also the reports that tend to use more 
complex language (thus reducing readability). 
3. Research design and methodology
The study was guided by two research questions:
•	 RQ1: To what extent do the narrative styles of South African CEOs’ 
shareholder letters, when compared with the narrative styles in the CEO 
shareholder letters of top international companies, reflect institutional 
isomorphism?
•	 RQ2: To what extent are the narrative styles present in South African 
CEOs’ shareholder letters indicative of impression management 
techniques?
Source documents
The South African source documents consisted of CEOs’ shareholder letters en-
closed in the 2018 integrated annual reports published online by all companies listed 
in the consumer goods sector and consumer services sector of the JSE’s main board. 
These are the second and third largest industry sectors on the JSE. These integrated 
reports were the most recent that were available for download when the data was 
gathered during the course of June 2019. Two integrated reports had no CEO share-
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holder letters, and two of the companies had not yet made an integrated report avail-
able online. The final document count totalled 50 CEOs’ shareholder letters with the 
average length being approximately 2,000 words. (See Appendix for a listing of the 
50 companies, each company’s industry, each CEO’s name and gender, and the word 
count of each shareholder letter.) Since this was an exploratory study, we considered 
the sample size of 50 letters from JSE companies to be sufficient for a determination 
of narrative styles in South African corporate shareholder letters. The sample size 
was comparable to those used in the Laskin (2018) and Craig and Amernic (2018) 
studies. 
In order to allow for a comparison between the South African shareholder letters 
and international ones, we drew on the data analysis conducted by Craig and Amer-
nic (2018), who looked at the contents of CEOs’ shareholder letters for 91 Fortune 
500 companies and 77 FTSE 100 companies, i.e., a total of 168 CEOs’ shareholder 
letters that we regarded as being good representations of the narrative styles of inter-
national companies’ CEOs.
Narrative analysis
This study made use of DICTION 7.1.3 software, with its corresponding 31 dictio-
naries of word lists. DICTION, as developed by Hart (2000), and improved by Hart 
and Carroll (2013), analyses text for specific linguistic tones or styles. The software 
classifies text into five master variables or styles—certainty, optimism, activity, realism, 
and commonality. First, frequencies (word counts as percentages of total words in the 
document) are determined for each dictionary. Individual dictionary frequencies are 
then added or subtracted to arrive at the count for each of the five master variables 
or styles. Each dictionary belongs to one style only (DICTION, n.d.). The output 
scores are standardised for each dictionary and for the five master variables/styles, 
enabling direct comparison with the output scores of other texts. We used this fea-
ture to answer RQ1, comparing output scores from our sample with those of the 
international sample analysed by Craig and Amernic (2018). Each of the 50 South 
African shareholder letters was manually extracted from its integrated report and 
processed through DICTION.
No textual analysis software is without limitations. Loughran and McDonald (2016), 
as well as Craig and Amernic (2018), note that some of the words in the DICTION 
word lists can be misinterpreted in the context of accounting or financial analysis. 
For example, they indicate that a word such as necessary, listed as a positive word in 
DICTION, can have a negative connotation in accounting or financial literature. 
However, we believe that sound classification of the vast majority of the words in the 
extensive DICTION word lists, and the way in which the master variables are con-
structed from the individual dictionaries, minimises the effect of some words being 
misclassified in accounting contexts. Furthermore, we take confidence from the fact 
that many researchers have relied on DICTION for narrative analyses of corporate 
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communications (see, for example, Arena et al., 2015; Arslan-Ayaydin et al., 2016; 
Bozzolan et al., 2015; Craig & Brennan, 2012; Craig & Amernic, 2018; Dikolli et al., 
2020; Greiner et al., 2020; Hassan, 2019; Laskin, 2018; Melloni, Caglio & Perego, 
2017; Ober et al., 1999; Yuthas et al., 2002). 
4. Findings and analysis
To address the first research question (RQ1), we generated our DICTION results 
across the 50 JSE (South African) documents and compared them to the results that 
Craig and Amernic (2018) generated from their analysis, also using DICTION, of 
their aforementioned two sets of CEO shareholder letters: 91 from Fortune 500 
companies and 77 from FTSE 100 companies. Table 1 contains the descriptive sta-
tistics for the five DICTION master variables (narrative styles) for the 50 JSE share-
holder letters, and also provides the mean values found by Craig and Amernic (2018) 
in their Fortune 500 and FTSE 100 samples. 
Table 1 shows that the most prominent narrative style across all three samples is 
that of optimism with a mean score of 55.43 in the JSE sample and mean scores of 
56.54 and 56.12 respectively in the Fortune and FTSE samples analysed by Craig 
and Amernic (2018). DICTION defines optimism as “[l]anguage endorsing some 
person, group, concept or event or highlighting their positive entailments” (DIC-
TION, n.d.). As the purpose of the CEO’s shareholder letter is to report on the 
achievements of the company’s management during the past year, it is unsurprising 
that optimism emerges as the most dominant narrative style.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the 5 DICTION master variables 














mean minimum maximum std. deviation
optimism 55.43 50.18 59.68 2.69 56.54 56.12
realism 52.67 48.93 56.59 2.10 54.84 54.38
activity 49.26 46.82 51.36 1.31 49.12 49.24
commonality 49.04 44.89 54.28 2.19 49.08 49.13
certainty 46.67 36.92 52.84 4.22 47.17 47.93
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The second most popular narrative style identified in the JSE sample, as well as in 
the Fortune 500 and FTSE 100 samples analysed by Craig and Amernic (2018), 
is realism, with a mean score of 52.67 in the JSE shareholder letters and means of 
54.84 and 54.38, respectively, in the Fortune 500 and FTSE 100 letters. DICTION 
(n.d.) describes realism as “[l]anguage describing tangible, immediate, recognizable 
matters that affect people’s everyday lives”. When a CEO reports, they are indicating, 
amongst other issues, how the activities of the company have affected its workers, the 
surrounding community, and other stakeholders. The activities and strategies of the 
company thus need to be explained in realistic, tangible ways. Although the focus 
of Craig and Amernic’s (2018) study was on CEO hubris, they also conclude that 
realism as a narrative style is a hallmark of CEOs’ shareholder letters. 
The activity narrative style was found to have the third-highest mean in all three 
samples: 49.26 in the JSE sample, 49.12 in the Fortune 500 sample, and 49.24 in the 
FTSE 100 sample. Activity language is defined, in the DICTION software, as “[l]
anguage featuring movement, change, the implementation of ideas and the avoid-
ance of inertia” (DICTION, n.d.). This narrative style is to be expected in a CEO’s 
shareholder letter, as the CEO is describing how past plans and strategies have been 
implemented. This style was found to have the lowest standard deviation of the five 
master variables in the JSE sample. An explanation for this low variation between 
CEOs could be that almost all CEOs can be expected to write about how previous 
plans were executed or adapted, as that is arguably core to what “management” en-
tails.
Commonality as narrative style was found to rank fourth in the South African CEOs’ 
letters and in the letters analysed by Craig and Amernic (2018). Commonality showed 
means of 49.04 in the JSE sample, 49.08 in the Fortune 500 sample, and 49.13 in 
the FTSE 100 sample. DICTION (n.d.) describes this narrative style as “[l]anguage 
highlighting the agreed-upon values of a group and rejecting idiosyncratic modes of 
engagement”. It makes sense for CEOs to use this narrative style as they are trying 
to indicate how the company’s strategy execution is achieving the company’s shared 
vision and mission in the longer term. Furthermore, in terms of the agency relation-
ship, the board is appointed by the shareholders and this could spur CEOs on to 
communicate how the management team’s (agents) and her or his values align with 
those of the shareholders (principal).
The least-used narrative style in our sample and in the samples analysed by Craig 
and Amernic (2018) was found to be certainty. As seen in Table 1, the means that 
emerged were 46.67, 47.17 and 47.93, respectively. These scores are well below the 
fourth-ranked style. DICTION defines the certainty narrative style as “[l]anguage 
indicating resoluteness, inflexibility, and completeness and a tendency to speak ex-ca-
thedra”. When addressing shareholders in the shareholder letter, the CEO must be 
cognisant of the fact that realities on the ground may force plans to change, and that 
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the company should be flexible. Furthermore, the CEO may be attuned to the real-
ity that in many situations, decisions are taken with the best available information, 
which is not necessarily complete information. Fear of litigation can also dampen 
the CEO’s use of certainty as a narrative style. This narrative style had the largest 
standard deviation. We assume that this was due to the variations in levels of risk 
specific to each company. 
RQ1 asked to what extent a comparison of the narrative styles in South African and 
international CEOs’ shareholder letters would reflect institutional isomorphism. The 
combined results from Table 1 lead us to conclude that the narrative styles applied 
by South African CEOs in their shareholder letters do not meaningfully differ from 
those of the international company CEOs’ letters analysed by Craig and Amernic 
(2018). If one assumes that most CEOs of large, listed companies complete similar 
managerial training (e.g., MBA), the similarity in dominant communication styles 
could be attributable to normative isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The 
fact that the standard of corporate governance in South Africa is judged to be on par 
with that of some of the world’s strongest developed countries (WEF, 2019) con-
tributes to the validity of the finding that normative isomorphism is at work, even 
when local institutional contexts might be different. Furthermore, the prevailing 
Anglo-American corporate culture amongst South African CEOs presumably rein-
forces normative isomorphism and thus contributes to the similarity between South 
African shareholder letters’ narrative styles and the styles found in shareholder letters 
written by the CEOs of large international companies listed in the US and the UK. 
We reject mimetic isomorphism as an explanation as there is not a strong novelty 
aspect to writing a shareholder letter (“new” or “uncertain” conditions are required for 
mimetic isomorphism). Thousands of examples of shareholder letters are available 
on companies’ websites and they are a standard feature of integrated annual reports. 
RQ2 asked to what extent the narrative styles in South African CEOs’ sharehold-
er letters could be indicative of the use of impression management techniques. To 
answer this, we revert to how each of the master variables (styles) is computed in 
DICTION. The optimism score is a composite of positive words from which neg-
ative words relating to blame, hardship, and denial are deducted. A high net score 
for optimism, which emphasises praise and accomplishments, seems likely to be an 
indication of impression management in our sample companies. The CEO is poten-
tially trying to win the favour of the shareholders who must vote at the next annual 
general meeting on their renewed contract and variable remuneration. DICTION’s 
computation of realism similarly consists of positive scores for, amongst others, fa-
miliarity and human interest, from which scores for past concerns and complexity 
are deducted. A high realism score can also be interpreted as evidence of impression 
management, in the sense that the CEO is trying to establish rapport and putting a 
“human face” on the company. Alternatively, the CEO could be trying to win sympa-
thy from the shareholders, despite the poor performance of the management team. In 
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answering the second research question, we therefore conclude that certain narrative 
styles employed by the CEOs of JSE-listed consumer goods and services companies 
in their shareholder letters can be understood as evidence of the use of impression 
management tactics. This should concern readers of shareholder letters and regula-
tors, as excessive impression management can increase client risk and, in turn, audit 
fees (Dikolli et al., 2020; Greiner et al., 2020), resulting in increased monitoring costs 
for shareholders.
5. Conclusions
This study contributes to the body of literature on normative institutional isomor-
phism. Our findings indicate that the economic development status of a country does 
not necessarily mean that its CEOs will employ different narrative styles to those of 
the CEOs of large international companies based in much richer countries when 
communicating with shareholders. We propose that good corporate governance 
standards, cultural commonalities, and standardised business education contribute 
to normative isomorphism and limit heterogeneity in corporate narrative styles. It 
is also argued that the South African CEOs’ dominant communication styles in the 
shareholder letters lend themselves to being tools of impression management.
The study also has limitations, with the limitations indicative of ample scope for 
future research. As an exploratory study, the scope was confined to companies in the 
consumer goods and consumer services industries, and to a single year of reporting. 
An investigation of the narrative styles of CEOs of South African companies in 
other industries would provide useful insights. Observing narrative styles over time 
would provide insight into the degree to which (if at all) narrative styles evolve as a 
company grows (or contracts). Textual analysis of additional corporate documents, 
such as complete integrated annual reports and/or sustainability reports, would also 
be of value. 
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Appendix: South African sample for the study




ADvTECH Ltd. Roy Douglas Male Consumer services 2,141
Anheuser-Busch InBev 
SA/NV Carlos Brito Male Consumer goods 2,407
Astral Foods Ltd. Chris Schutte Male Consumer goods 5,413
AVI Ltd. Simon Crutchley Male Consumer goods 2,806
Bid Corporation Limited Bernard Berson Male Consumer services 3,385
British American Tobac-
co plc Nicandro Durante Male Consumer goods 1,112
Cashbuild Ltd. Werner de Jager Male Consumer services 1,117
Clicks Ltd. David Kneale Male Consumer services 2,384
Clover Industries Ltd. Johann Vorster Male Consumer goods 1,819
Comair Ltd. Erik Venter Male Consumer services 4,062
Combined Motor Hold-
ings Ltd. JD McIntosh Male Consumer services 2,512
Crookes Brothers Ltd. Guy Clarke Male Consumer goods 1,023
Curro Ltd. Andries Greyling Male Consumer services 649
Dischem Ltd.
Ivan Leon Saltz-
man Male Consumer services 1,759
Famous Brands Ltd. Darren Hele Male Consumer services 2,245
HomeChoice Holdings 
Ltd. Gregoire Lartigue Male Consumer services 2,074
Hosken Passenger Logis-
tics and Rail Ltd. Francois Meyer Male Consumer services 906
Italtile Ltd. Jan Potgieter Male Consumer services 3,481
Kaap Agri Bedryf Ltd. Sean Walsh Male Consumer services 1,257
Lewis Group Ltd. Johan Enslin Male Consumer services 1,065
Libstar Holdings Ltd.
Andries van Rens-
burg Male Consumer goods 2,349
Massmart Holdings Ltd. Guy Hayward Male Consumer services 4,112
Metair Investments Ltd. Theo Loock Male Consumer goods 1,902
Mr Price Group Ltd. Stuart Bird Male Consumer services 698
Naspers Ltd. Bob van Dijk Male Consumer services 1,851
Northam Platinum Ltd. Paul Dunne Male Consumer services 1,675
Oceana Group Ltd. Imraan Soomra Male Consumer goods 2,382
Pepkor Holdings Ltd. Leon Lourens Male Consumer services 1,276
Phumelela Gaming & 
Leisure Ltd. John Stuart Male Consumer services 1,844
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Pick n Pay Stores Ltd. Richard Brasher Male Consumer services 2,113
Pioneer Foods Ltd. Tertius Carstens Male Consumer goods 1,651
Premier Fishing and 
Brands Ltd.
Mogamat Samier 
Saban Male Consumer goods 1,091
Quantum Foods Ltd. Hendrik Lourens Male Consumer goods 2,115
RCL Foods Ltd. Miles Dally Male Consumer goods 4,071
Rex Trueform Group 
Ltd.
Catherine Rad-
owsky Female Consumer services 855
Rhodes Food Group Ltd. Bruce Henderson Male Consumer goods 1,217
Sea Harvest Group Ltd. Felix Ratheb Male Consumer goods 1,272
Seardel Investment Corp. 
Ltd. André van der Veen Male Consumer services 867
Shoprite Holdings Ltd. Pieter Engelbrecht Male Consumer services 1,034
Spur Corporation Ltd. Pierre van Tonder Male Consumer services 2,811
Stadio Holdings Ltd.
Chris van der 
Merwe Male Consumer services 537
Steinhoff International 
NV Louis du Preez Male Consumer goods 2,926
Sun International Ltd. Anthony Leeming Male Consumer services 3,056
Taste Holdings Ltd. Tyrone Moodley Male Consumer services 2,090
The Foschini Group Ltd. Doug Murray Male Consumer services 2,002
The Spar Group Ltd. Graham O’Connor Male Consumer services 1,931
Tiger Brands Ltd.
Lawrence Mac-
Dougall Male Consumer goods 2,096
Truworths Ltd. Michael Mark Male Consumer services 2,290
Tsogo Sun Ltd. Jacques Booysen Male Consumer services 2,477
Vivo Energy plc
Christian Cham-
mas Male Consumer services 1,184
Woolworths Holdings 
Ltd. Ian Moir Male Consumer services 2,388
